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1Introduction
Instability is a pervasive phenomenon that has deep implications for virtually all complex
social and technical systems.
In engineering, the identification and mitigation of various types of technical instabilities
is a well developed practice.  This is a key focus, for example, of engineers concerned about the
prevention of potentially destabilizing vibration in the frame of an aircraft or the mitigation of
sources of technical instability in the operation of a nuclear reactor.  However, the nature of
instability in complex social and technical systems is relatively unstudied and not well
understood.  This is unfortunate because instability can have profound effects on the
performance of those systems as well as their ability to improve their performance over time.
In this paper, we present a conceptual framework for understanding instability in socio-
technical systems.  To illustrate what we mean by instability in the context of complex
engineering systems, we will draw on data from the aerospace industry.  In particular, we use
two data sets, to trace the impacts of various sources of instability.  One data set centers on
instability and its impact on aerospace programs, while the other centers on instability and its
impact on aerospace production and design facilities.
Consider the case of the F-22 program, which certainly is a complex engineering design
and production system.  It has also suffered significantly from instability over the course of its
lifecycle to date.  We will focus in on three specific sources of instability to illustrate this:
technological, organizational and economic instability.  Economic instability is reflected in
several successive budget cuts – some small and some substantial – that have taken place since
the inception of the program.  This has forced the development of more than 20 program master
2plans, with far-ranging ripple effects on the prime contractors, employees, suppliers,
communities and other stakeholders.  Technological instability is particularly evident in the
avionics, which were first designed at a time when the fastest available computer chip was a 386
micro-processor.  Each major advance in computer technology has forced complex sets of
choices around what to re-design and what to functionality to leave unchanged, using the older
technologies.  Organizational instability is reflected in the merger of Lockheed, Martin Marietta,
and the General Dynamics aeronautical sector into Lockheed Martin, as well as countless
organizational initiatives, restructurings, partnerships, acquisitions, and leadership transitions.
Despite these significant instabilities, the requirement to develop and deliver a complex,
advanced aircraft system never wavered.2
Traditionally, designers of complex engineering systems have addressed instability as an
exogenous factor and concentrated on building buffers to cushion its impact.  More recently, the
focus has shifted to build flexibility so that systems might be robust in the face of instability.
More rarely, though perhaps most effectively, designers have renegotiated the scope or
boundaries of systems in order to address the forces or factors driving the instability.3
Ultimately, organizations have to do more than develop and deliver complex systems while
confronting the challenges of instability, though.  They must also achieve continuous
improvement in aspects of their operations, which typically occurs through initiatives such as
Lean, Six-Sigma, and others.
In this context, a key statistical process control (SPC) principle revolves around the
importance of stability (or at least reduced variability) as a pre-condition for improvement
efforts.4  Figure 1, for example, is a common illustration of the importance of stability – showing
two dart games with a more stable but off center player on the right facing fewer uncertainties in
3the path to improvement than the less stable but higher scoring player on the left.  Most lean
implementation frameworks build on this concept and urge the establishment of stability prior to
the implementation of systems for “flow” and “pull.”  A deeper understanding of the nature of
instability promises useful insights into the extent to which stability in complex systems can be
achieved, and into how complex system performance can be improved in cases where instability
is unavoidable.
Figure 1.  Illustration of the Importance of Stability Prior to Improvement
Defining Instability
We define instability as a dynamic pattern of stimulus and response in which events
become successively less predictable or controllable.
Classically, instability in physical systems is defined as a perturbation that is amplified by
feedback in a divergent process – resulting in increased variability.  In the context of many
complex social and technical systems, there may be many perturbations, many related and
unrelated responses and great difficulty distinguishing superficial symptoms from underlying
4sources of instability.  Stability does not necessarily mean the absence of perturbations or new
stimulus.  It is just a state where responses to perturbations do not induce unpredictable or
uncontrollable outcomes.
As part of this definition of instability, it is important to note that instability is not the
same as variability.  Instability involves both a degree of unpredictability and an increasing lack
of control.  In this sense, instability can be understood as representing a particular kind of
uncertainty in a complex engineered system – one that is particularly challenging for the
architects, leaders and others in these systems.
Empirical Background
To illustrate some of the dynamics associated with instability in socio-technical systems,
we present findings from two separate lines of research – one focusing on instability at what can
be termed the program level and one on what can be termed the facility level.  Both studies are
focused on the U.S. aerospace industry.  At the outset a few cautions are needed.  First, the focus
on aerospace means that the findings may or may not be fully generalizable to other sectors of
the economy.  Second, each of the studies involves cross-sectional survey research, combined
with some longitudinal case study research – which will only partly capture important
longitudinal aspects of instability.  Third, the analysis of these data is not complete.  In these
respects, the research should be treated as illustrative rather than confirmatory.
In the program level research, Some 500 surveys were distributed to the senior program
officers in government program management offices in 1996, with 154 providing usable data,
yielding a response rate of nearly 31%. Some 300 surveys were distributed to US aerospace
industry program managers.  102 surveys provided usable data, yielding a response rate of 34%.
5The surveys were part of a study that addressed instability in a comprehensive manner for the
first time.  As such, it included a variety of questions covering the extent to which a program was
affected by instability, what the sources of that instability were, and the strategies the program
managers found most effective in avoiding or mitigating the instability.  The program-level
research identified three primary types of instability faced by aerospace programs: budget or
funding instability, instability due to changes in technology, and requirements instability.
In the facility level research, 2123 surveys were distributed in 1999 to the senior facility
managers in a stratified random sample of facilities in the airframe, engine, avionics and other
key sectors taken from the International Aerospace Directory.  Over 100 surveys were returned
as bad addresses or facilities that were no longer in the aerospace business (both of which are, at
least in part, reflections of instability).  Additional follow-up phone calls suggesting that at least
15 percent of the sample should be excluded as not a valid part of the sample.  As a result, the
196 usable surveys that were returned probably represent an 11 percent response rate.  This
research on facilities also focused on three different types of instability:  Budget or funding
instability, technology instability, instability due to organizational changes such as
mergers/acquisitions and other restructuring, and instability in the supply chain.
Although the two projects were conducted independently, there is an important
relationship between the two levels of research.  The research as the facility level can be seen as
operating at a lower, nested level in relation to the research on aerospace programs – which
spans many facilities.  In this sense, the two projects examine what can be thought of as sub-
systems within larger systems.  While aerospace may be unique in many respects, both studies
indicate that instability is a central characteristic of the socio-technical systems found in this
industry – manifest at both levels studies here.
6Costs of Instability
Both studies point to substantial costs associated with instability. The program-level
study found that, on average, programs experienced 7-8 percent annual cost growth (that is,
cumulative cost growth of 7-8 percent each year beyond the program plan) from a variety of
sources.  Program managers then attributed that cost growth to various sources, including budget
changes, requirements changes, and technical problems (with the breakdown among types of
instability listed in Table 1.)  Follow-up interviews with senior program officers confirmed the
overall levels of cost growth and their sources, but raised some questions about whether that cost
growth could be segregated so cleanly into discrete categories.  The point they raised is that
interdependencies between funding, requirements, and technical challenges mean that a change
in one is likely to affect the others as they are in turn adjusted to return the program to an
equilibrium state.  Given this uncertainty, it may be reasonable to say that not all program cost-
growth is instability-related, but it is realistic to say that a non-trivial component is.  This
dilemma illustrates very well the interdependencies and stimulus and response nature of
instability in complex systems.
 Table 1. Average Annual Program Cost Growth and Its Sources.
 
Source of Program Cost
Growth
Government Sample
Average Annual Cost
Growth (N=101)
Contractor Sample
Average Annual
Cost Growth
(N=80)
Budget or Funding Instability 2.3% 1.8%
Technical Difficulties 2.4% 2.7%
Requirements Changes 2.5% 2.7%
Other 0.1% 0.8%
Total 7.3% 8.0%
7The same programs experienced 21-24 percent overall schedule slippage as a result of
instability (with Table 2 breaking out the impact across different types of instability).   The same
caveats apply to parsing this schedule slip into discrete categories as they did to parsing cost
growth.  The program-level research also documented other costs of instability, including rework
associated with creating new plans and contracts, reduction in quantities delivered to meet
requirements, and impact on the industrial base through reduction in profits and other factors.  A
notable finding was that suppliers of critical parts had a much greater risk of deciding to exit the
aerospace industry in programs that had high levels of instability than those that did not.
Table 2. Sources of Program Schedule Slip.
Source of Program Schedule
Slip
Government
Sample Average
Schedule Slip (N=
76)
Contractor
Sample Average
Schedule Slip (N=
66)
Budget or Funding Instability 8.2% 7.8%
Technical Difficulties 6.3% 5.8%
Requirements Changes 5.0% 3.4%
Other 4.2% 4.0%
Total 23.7% 21.0%
Mean Baseline (months) 85 70
 The costs of instability are also evident at the facility level.  Among programs
experiencing higher levels of instability (for any of the four types of instability examined), Table
3 indicates that approximately 43-56 percent reported an increased loss of people with critical
skills.  By contrast, only 25-26 percent of the facilities experiencing lower levels of instability
reported the same loss of people with critical skills.  Note that this finding directly corresponds
8to the reported loss of suppliers in the program-level research.  In each case, a key factor input is
at risk as a result of the instability dynamics.
Table 3.  Instability and Reported Loss of People with Critical Skills
Percent of Organizations Reporting a Loss of
People with Critical Skills
Type of Instability at
Facility
Organizations
Reporting Low Levels
of Instability
Organizations
Reporting High
Levels of Instability
Budget or Funding
Instability
25% 43%
Instability Associated with
New Technology
26% 48%
Organizational Instability 25% 52%
Supply Chain Instability 25% 56%
In summary, program instability represents a significant challenge to the creation and
realization of complex systems within the assumptions that prevailed at their commencement.
Significant cost growth and schedule slippage may represent mortal threats to programs.  The
insidious burdens levied by instability also threaten the underlying productive capability required
to produce complex systems, whether it involves key factor inputs such as capital or labor or in
the technology and supply bases.
Sources of Instability
Given the cost of instability in complex systems, it important to try to better understand
its sources in hope of ultimately devising effective remedies.  Up to this point, we have largely
addressed manifestations of instability.  In this section we review the data that describes its
sources.  There was no single dominant source of instability that stood out in the facility level
research, as is illustrated in Figure 3.  The most common sources of instability facing facilities
included: changes in product demand, changes in customer requirements, and changes in
9government budget allocations, reductions in the number of suppliers (impacting facilities who
are suppliers), and changes in company budgets.  The first, changes in product demand was cited
by 22% of the facilities and the rest were all cited by 9% or fewer of the facilities.  This diversity
of sources of instability suggests that there will not be any single point solution to this challenge.
Figure 3:  Most Significant Sources of Instability at the Facility Level
At the program level, the factors causing the greatest instability were similar to those
seen at the facility level, including changes in budgets, changes in user requirements and
technical challenges associated with the program.  This was true for the government program
offices and for the contractor organizations.  The full set of responses on various sources of
program instability is listed in Figures 4 and 5.  Similar to the facility survey, there are multiple
perceived sources of instability, albeit with lower perceived levels of impact on the program.
22%
10% 9% 9% 7% 7% 7%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Change in
product
demand
Change in
customer
requirements
Change in
government
budget
allocations
Reducing
number of
suppliers
Change in
internal
company
budgets
Re-engineering/
restructuring
Leadership
vision changes
Other Sources of Instability:
• Customer/Supplier Cooperation
Problems (4%)
• Mergers or Acquisitions (4%)
• Staff Turnover (3%)
• Subcontracting (3%)
• Supplier Performance (2%)
• Government Acquisition Changes (2%)
• Technical Challenges (2%)
• New Equipment/Technology (2%)
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 Figure 4. Rated Sources of Program Instability (Government).
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not a 
Factor
The Primary 
Factor
Budget changes
Changes in user requirements
Technical challenges in this program
Long acquisition cycle
Staffing changes (SPO or contractor)
Contractor problems
Changing acquisition priorities
Other programs' technical problems
Cooperation with other organizations
 N= 146.  The horizontal lines indicate breakpoints where statistically significant
differences in the responses occur (determined using the Wilcoxon non-parametric test at
the p=0.05 level of significance).
 
 
 Figure 5. Rated Sources of Program Instability (Contractor).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not a 
Factor
The Primary 
Factor
Technical challenges in this program
Budget changes
Changing user requirements
Cooperation with other organizations
Poor supplier performance
Long acquisition cycle
Changing customer acquisition priorities
Staffing turnover in own program
Production buy changes
Staffing turnover at customer
Technical challenges from other programs
N= 98.  The horizontal lines indicate breakpoints where statistically significant differences in the
responses occur (determined using the Wilcoxon non-parametric test at the p=0.05 level of
significance).
A number of factors relating to the acquisition environment and program strategy were
examined to determine their impact on perceived instability in a program.  While the many
program attributes did not explain a significant amount of variance in the perceived effect of
11
instability on a program, there were three attributes that did.  They were the total program
budget, the program length from start to the planned initial operational capability (IOC) of the
system, and the degree to which revolutionary or incremental process technology was required.
In other words, the impact of instability is felt most with larger programs, longer running
programs, and programs that involve revolutionary process innovations.  Among contractors, the
level of advance in product technologies, in addition to the others indicated by the government
program responses, were associated with higher levels of instability.
Surprisingly, many of the factors that were anticipated to affect a program’s stability
were found not to have done so.  Specifically, the following attributes of a program were not
found to explain any statistically significant variance in perceived program instability:  the
degree of design uncertainty (including the phase of the program in the system’s life-cycle),
programmatic complexity (including programs with joint contractors, programs with foreign
military sales or international partners, and multiple independent funding sources), perceived
priority of the program, or the government service or agency involved.  These findings suggest
that instability is a larger system phenomenon, with that system being defined beyond the
boundaries of the immediate program.
Addressing Instability
As was suggested at the outset of the paper, a traditional response to instability is to build
buffers so as to insulate the system or to increase flexibility.  At the facility level, such
approaches were quite common.  The senior facility managers responding to the survey were
asked how extensively they utilized each item on a list of 26 management practices, labor
strategies or technology tools that might be in use in response to the effects of instability.  As
12
Figure 6 illustrates, the common responses centered on cross training, skills development,
flexible technology and employee empowerment.  One of the items – long-term supplier
agreements – can be understood as renegotiating the boundaries of the system (albeit firmly
within the domain of control of the customer facility), but this is the only response that has this
quality.
Figure 6.  Most Common Facility Responses to Instability
In contrast, the least common responses include a number of items that would require a
substantial renegotiation of system boundaries, as is illustrated by Figure 7.  These include the
movement of work and people across multiple facilities.  While the balancing of work and staff
across multiple facilities might significantly mitigate the effects of instability, it would require
new institutional arrangements among management, labor and communities.  Such arrangements
do exist in other industries – such as the use of hiring halls in the construction industry or
networking organizations in the Silicon Valley – but they are examples of loosely-coupled
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systems that rely on market mechanisms for coordination and control.  These data point to the
lack of such mechanisms in aerospace, where system coordination and control mechanisms must
necessarily be more tightly coupled.  Note too that the respondents were not even asked about
mechanisms such as the restructuring of government acquisition policies or other forms of
renegotiation that would be far beyond the focus of any given aerospace facility.
Figure 7.  Least Common Facility Responses to Instability
The program-level study also examined mechanisms to address instability.  In this case,
respondents were asked to indicate the effectiveness of strategies to avoid program instability, as
well as mitigate its negative impact on their programs.  Overall effectiveness was gauged by
averages of the ratings for all of the strategies explored.  Additionally, the responses of the top
quartile of programs (based on program cost performance, in this case those programs that either
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met or were below their planned program cost) were compared with the rest of the sample to
assess whether these higher-performing programs had a different understanding of the
effectiveness of program instability responses.  Two points are worth noting before reviewing the
data.
First, the distinction between instability avoidance and mitigation is subtle but important
to understanding the perceived effectiveness of responses.  Instability avoidance is a
renegotiation strategy aimed at preventing instability in the first place, typically by addressing
the program’s exogenous environment.  Mitigation strategies, in contrast, largely focus on
buffers and flexibility in order to take corrective action once instability (in this case considered
an exogenous factor) has struck.
Second, what is considered an effective strategy depends on the type of work being done
and who is doing it. It is important to bear in mind the differences in concerns and stakeholders
for both the government and the contractor when reviewing their responses to instability
response strategies.  The primary job of government program managers is to coordinate between
multiple organizations to define, contract for, and ensure that a system is delivered that conforms
with the expectations of all parties.  In essence, the government program manager delivers a
program (i.e., a product, at a specified cost, delivered on a specified schedule) that conforms as
closely as possible to the agreed-to plan.  The contractor, on the other hand, is responsible for
delivering the system, and is concerned with all the details of realizing that system, from
working with suppliers to managing labor relations to developing an appropriate design.
The top-rated program-level instability avoidance for government program managers was
having the system’s user involved in developing the system’s requirements.  Also rated high in
effectiveness (all equally rated for effectiveness) were aggressive advocacy to generate support
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for the program, involving the contractor in developing the system’s requirements, and involving
the contractor in developing schedule.  The contractor’s response was similar; the top response
was open, frequent communication with customer, followed by aggressive advocacy to generate
support for the program, involving the contractor in developing the system’s requirements, and
involving the system’s user in developing the system’s requirements.  Note that in the case of
instability avoidance, the strategies considered most effective by contractor and government
program managers alike involved reaching out across organization boundaries to involve key
stakeholders.  Interestingly, the lowest-rated strategies for instability avoidance in general
involve what might be considered endogenous program management tools—primarily risk
reduction by taking incremental steps in technology or program management hedges.
Top-rated instability mitigation strategies common to both contractors and government
program managers include the use of integrated product teams (IPTs) and management reserve.
In the mitigation response we begin to see differences between government and contractor
priorities.  Government program managers also rated as most effective managing all major
subsystems within one program office and involving users in program decision-making.  This
conforms to the primary government role of coordinating inputs from multiple stakeholders.  In
contrast, contractors rated more highly the use of computer-aided tools for scheduling, modeling,
and design.  These all represent means to respond flexibly to exogenously-imposed changes
while still delivering a product.  These same strategies were not valued as highly effective by
government program managers for mitigating the effects of program instability.
Interestingly, when one examines the responses of those programs that were in the top
quartile for cost performance, a consensus begins to emerge between government and contractor
program managers on the top-rated instability mitigation strategies.  The highest-performing
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programs place more emphasis on the ability to flexibly respond to changes (e.g., the use of
computer-aided tools for scheduling, modeling, and design) and risk management (e.g.,
shortening the pace of technological advance, validating designs during system development).
The convergence of opinion among these top-performing programs in both government and
contractor sites suggests a correlation with the top instability avoidance strategies—developing a
shared view of the system and how to respond to perturbations.
Altogether, the three different strategies for addressing instability are summarized in
Figure 8.  The first is the more traditional approach of building in buffers, where the system is
insulated from sources of instability.  The second is a flexible approach, where some aspects of
instability enter the system and drive adjustment or adaptation.  The third is one where the
system boundary is expanded so that the sources of instability are incorporated within the
definition of the system.
Figure 8.  Three Approaches to Instability in Complex Social and Technical Systems
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Conclusion
This has been a preliminary exploration of the concept of instability.  In complex social
and technical systems, instability is both all pervasive and highly problematic.  Instability is not
the same as variation – it also involves a degree of unpredictability and increasing lack of
control.
The survey results suggest that it is difficult, but feasible to highlight factors that act as
sources of instability for aerospace facilities and programs.   Further, it is possible to identify
significant costs that can be attributed, at least in part, to these sources of instability.  Finally, an
analysis of the reported mechanisms for addressing instability highlights strategies that range
from buffers to designed flexibility to the very renegotiation of the system boundaries.
At the heart of this paper is a suggested shift in the engineering mindset when it comes to
instability – a shift from seeing instability as a contextual circumstance or a description of
system behavior to seeing instability as an appropriate domain for attention and action.  Much of
traditional engineering systems teaching and practice involves what can be thought of as a
“buffering” strategy for addressing instability.  This includes incorporating contingency options
in program planning, emphasizing “robust” design that essentially consists of adding technical
margin, establishing inventory capacity in material flow systems, and other approaches that are
focused on a relatively narrow span of control on the part of the system designers.   All of these
responses are designed to insulate a system from the impact of instability.  At the root of this
approach is a key underlying assumption in much of systems engineering, which involves
establishing system boundaries, optimizing operations within those boundaries, and buffering
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interactions across the boundaries.  In fact, the most common responses to instability at the
facility level involved these buffering strategies.
Increasingly, attention to “lean” and “agile” approaches to operations represents
movement from a buffer strategy to more of a flexibility strategy.  In these cases, for example, a
focus on small batches, cycle time improvement and value stream flow all represent ways to
minimize the lag between stimulus and response.  In this respect, these approaches open up the
boundaries on many engineered systems to encompass supply chains, market shifts, and other
factors previously treated as exogenous to the system.
Ultimately, the logic of attending to instability involves a focus that goes beyond buffers
or even flexible responses.  It involves system design that incorporates capability to address the
root causes of instability.   This involves re-negotiating the very boundaries and definition of the
system.  We do find evidence of such strategies at the program level, which represents a broader
scope than the facility level, though much remains to be learned about the dynamics of such
strategies over time.
Anticipating longitudinal research on this topic, there are a number of propositions that
we offer as topics for further research on the concept of instability.  First, we would suggest that
narrowly focused responses to instability can actually increase, rather than mitigate the problem.
This is because buffers and flexible responses designed to minimize the impact of instability can
hamper the ability to see and understand of root causes.
Complex systems are driven by multiple factors with many interdependent relationships.
As such, research on instability should focus on the multiple interdependencies that exist in
socio-technical systems.  For example, we would predict that attempts to mitigate instabilities by
focusing on one variable may actually induce more instability – a dynamic worthy of further
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research. Efforts to mitigate instability at a “sub-system” level will have limited impact when the
source(s) of instability are at the level of the larger system.  As well, the impact of instability
varies across stakeholders, requiring multiple stakeholder involvement in the mitigation
response.
Instability is a longitudinal dynamic phenomenon in which mitigation efforts must
consider what can be termed the frequencies and harmonics of the underlying forcing functions,
as well as the damping functions if they are to be successful.  The research presented here has
been based on cross-sectional surveys and targeted case study analysis, which again points to the
need for further research attentive to the longitudinal dynamics.
The implications of this paper for Engineering Systems are multifold.  MIT has deep
expertise in the many buffering strategies and a growing commitment to building expertise in the
flexible strategies.  There are, however, only beginning areas of exploration around what it take
to renegotiate the definition of an engineering system.  We highlight this as an essential area for
research and education – with deep implications for policy and practice.  Ultimately, a deeper
appreciation of instability reveals the degree to which stability is never a steady state.  As such,
continuous improvement in social and technical systems depends on the mastery of strategies for
addressing instability.
20
Partial Endnotes
                                                 
1 We would like to thank MIT’s Lean Aerospace Initiative and MIT’s Labor Aerospace Research
Agenda – both projects supported the survey research presented in this paper.
2 Murman, et. al., Lean Enterprise Value:  Insights from MIT’s Lean Aerospace Initiative.  New
York:  Palgrave, 2002.
3 Walton, Richard, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Robert McKersie, Strategic Negotiations:  A
Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations.  Boston:  Harvard Business School Press,
1994.
4 Deming, W. Edwards.  Out of the Crisis.  Cambridge:  MIT CAES, 1986.
